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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4573 
___________ 
 
RODNEY SMITH, 
    Appellant 
    
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1:14-cv-00763) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 28, 2015 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 8, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Rodney Smith seeks this Court’s review of the District Court’s 
dismissal of his petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Because his appeal presents 
                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
   In February 2008, Smith was convicted in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania of two counts of possession of a firearm and ammunition 
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).  Based on his total offense 
level of 40 and his Category VI criminal history, Smith’s sentencing range under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines was 360 months’ to life imprisonment.  The District Court 
sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release.  This 
Court affirmed Smith’s conviction and sentence.  See United States v. Smith, 362 F. 
App’x 297 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Smith thereafter filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, arguing 
that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel due to several alleged 
errors concerning the application of the ACCA to enhance his sentence.  He alleged, in 
part, that his attorney failed to object to the use of a 1980 state-court drug conviction at 
sentencing.  The District Court denied Smith’s motion on the merits, and we declined to 
issue a certificate of appealability.  (See C.A. No. 12-3281.)   
 On April 1, 2014, we denied Smith’s request to file a second or successive § 2255 
motion, in which he sought to vacate his sentence.  He argued that his 1980 conviction 
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did not qualify as a “serious drug offense” that qualified him as a career offender under 
the ACCA based on the recent Supreme Court decision in Descamps v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and our decision in United States v. Tucker, 703 F.3d 205 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  (C.A. No. 14-1382.)  In Descamps, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that courts 
may not apply the “modified” categorical approach to sentencing under the ACCA when 
the crime at issue has a single, indivisible set of elements.  133 S. Ct. at 2281-82.  And in 
Tucker, we applied the modified categorical approach in holding that the appellant’s prior 
state conviction for conspiracy to sell drugs was not a serious drug offense within the 
meaning of the ACCA.   703 F.3d at 214.   
 Smith then filed the current § 2241 petition in his district of confinement, again 
asserting that his sentence should be vacated under Descamps and Tucker.  The District 
Court determined that § 2241 was not the proper vehicle for Smith’s claim, and dismissed 
the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
 Smith now appeals. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review 
over the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its 
factual findings.”  Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(per curiam).  We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order if there is no 
substantial question presented in the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
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 We find no error in the District Court’s dismissal of Smith’s petition, as it is 
apparent that his claim is not viable under § 2241.  A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255 is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a 
conviction or sentence.  See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  
In limited circumstances, a federal prisoner can seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if the 
remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his or her 
detention.  28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997).  
This occurs “only where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope of 
procedure would prevent” the petitioner from receiving adequate adjudication of his or 
her claims.  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538.  We have thus far applied this “safety valve” in the 
rare situation where a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction 
because an intervening change of the law decriminalized the conduct underlying the 
conviction.  Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).   
 As noted above, Smith claims that his sentence was wrongly enhanced under the 
ACCA because the sentencing court erroneously determined that a prior state-court drug 
conviction was a “serious drug offense,” and thus that he is factually innocent of being a 
career offender.  Smith asserts that he could not have brought this claim previously 
because Descamps created a new rule of substantive law in 2013.  He is incorrect.  In 
Descamps, the Court reaffirmed that its existing precedent permits application of the 
modified categorical approach for determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a 
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“violent felony” under the ACCA only when a statute is divisible, and then only to 
determine the subpart under which the defendant was convicted.  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 
2282-86.  Thus, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . explained that it was not announcing a new 
rule, but was simply reaffirming the Taylor [v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 
(1990)]/Shepard [v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005)] approach, which some courts had 
misconstrued.”  United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir. 2014).  Indeed, we 
already have decided that Descamps does not alter our ruling in Tucker that 35 Pa. Stat. § 
780-113(a)(30), which is the statute under which Smith was convicted in 1980, is 
divisible and properly subject to the modified categorical approach.  See United States v. 
Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 156 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2014).  And Tucker itself, which was based on 
the particular record of conviction before the District Court in that case, shows that Smith 
could have raised arguments regarding application of the modified categorical approach 
to his statute of conviction before Descamps.  Descamps does not constitute the rare 
situation of an intervening change of the law sufficient to apply the “safety valve” 
provided by § 2241.  See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120.   
  Further, Descamps applied principles that Smith could have raised as early as in 
his direct appeal.  And he did, in fact, set forth claims based on Descamps in his recent 
application to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.  His lack of success on his 
challenges to his sentence does not render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective,” or make 
reliance on § 2241 appropriate.  See Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251; Queen v. Miner, 530 
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F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming district court’s dismissal of § 2241 
petition where the issues raised had been, or could have been, decided in a prisoner’s 
previous habeas action).  Accordingly, relief is not available to Smith under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  We deny Smith’s 
motion for appointment of counsel.  
